PKL Rev11

Where Time Gets Its Direction

Where does the direction of time come from, if the laws have none?

The laws of mechanics know no earlier and no later. A film of colliding balls, played backwards, shows nothing that the laws forbid. The world they describe nevertheless runs in one direction: the coffee goes cold and not hot again, stars burn out, living beings arise and die, and some of them do physics. Where does the direction come from, if the laws have none?

Physics has a precise partial answer to this: the direction does not follow from the laws alone, but from them together with a state, ultimately the beginning. It says itself where this answer stops. Behind it stands a question that is as little decided as whether mathematics is discovered or invented: Is time a consequence of the laws of nature, or a condition under which there are laws at all?

This sheet does not decide it. It brings together what physics says about it, and alongside reads the logician Gotthard Günther, who followed the physics of his time for decades, from broken parity to entropy, and in whose titles time stands, in 1937, 1967 and 1978. Two of his sentences sharpen the question; they cannot decide it.

Three voices stand side by side here, and they stay apart: Günther, with work and page; the physics of today's textbooks, with its place; and the edition Rev11, the part of this project built and checked in Lean, there called the corpus. Where we put two of them together, we say so. Measurement in quantum mechanics is not at issue; the observer who appears at the end is a different one.

Symmetry: law and state

Why can a law be gained from a small section of nature that holds elsewhere? Feynman posed the question in 1964 at the end of his lectures on the character of physical law, called it unscientific and answered it unscientifically: "I think it is because nature has a simplicity and therefore a great beauty." (The Character of Physical Law, p. 173.) Physics has a word for it: symmetry. The symmetry of a figure is the group of all transformations that leave it unchanged (Mainzer, art. Symmetrie II, HWPh 10, col. 749). That a law remains unchanged under translation in space and time means nothing other than that it also holds where one has not measured it. For continuous symmetries this goes further: every continuous symmetry of the action yields a conserved quantity, translation in time the energy, translation in space the momentum (Noether 1918, first theorem; Kosmann-Schwarzbach 2009; Steane 2025, pp. 4 f.).

One distinction carries everything that follows. Symmetric may be the law, or the state it governs; the two do not coincide. A law can treat left and right alike and still permit states in which one of the two is distinguished. Physics calls this spontaneous symmetry breaking, and it leaves the law as it is: "the state of a really big system does not at all have to have the symmetry of the laws which govern it" (Anderson, More Is Different, Science 177, 1972, p. 395). Whoever programs has a picture for this, and only a picture: the program and the memory contents on which it runs. The program is the same everywhere; what has happened is in memory.

The law has no history. The history lies in the state.

Günther reads the word symmetry from Hegel. In "Die historische Kategorie des Neuen" (1970) he writes: "'Nature' means symmetry of systems of being." (our translation) And a few sentences further on: "A symmetrical world, however, is a totally unhistorical world, in which genuinely new things cannot occur in the sense defined by Hegel. Conversely, history is only a colloquial expression for structural asymmetry of reality." (our translation) (p. 11.) His symmetry is first that of two-valued logic, "the doctrine of all symmetry structures of the world" (our translation) (ibid.): every statement assigned to its negation, a relation of two sides (p. 10). That of physics is the group of mappings of an object onto itself. This is not the same concept, and at this passage Günther does not name physics; we read it as included.

That "nature" is the law and "history" the state, Günther does not say. It is our distribution of his two sentences onto the distinction of physics, and in Günther himself it has a limit: a state that breaks under the same law would by this account be mere change, not history in the sense of the new. New, according to the text of 1970, is only a change of the structural principle that cannot be reversed (pp. 7, 9; the connection of the two passages is ours). The conclusion comes back to this.

Parity

That nature does not distinguish right from left was taken for granted until 1956. In that year Lee and Yang showed that the conservation of parity in the weak interaction was "only an extrapolated hypothesis unsupported by experimental evidence", and proposed tests (Phys. Rev. 104, 1956, p. 254); the first experiment that showed the violation, submitted in January 1957, is named today after Chien-Shiung Wu (Wu et al., Phys. Rev. 105, 1957, p. 1413). The violation concerns only the weak interaction; the strong and the electromagnetic show none, and that has not changed (Lee/Yang 1956, p. 254; Blackmond 2019, p. 3). Unlike in spontaneous breaking, here it is not the state that is unsymmetric but the law itself: the weak interaction distinguishes left and right. Parity is a reflection, not a continuous transformation; Noether's theorem does not apply to it.

Günther knew the finding by name. In 1958 he names the "discovery of a partial asymmetry (nonparity) of reality" (our translation) as one date of the break between thought and world (Die gebrochene Rationalität, pp. 4 f.). What interests him in it is not the physics, but what it asks of logic: "So with the principle of non-parity, too, something is demanded of us that, ontologically considered, is impossible to experience." (our translation) (p. 5.) Eight years later parity stands in his work as a consequence of classical logic itself: if subject and object form "an exchange relation of enantiomorphic equivalence", "then the basic laws of Nature must obey the principle of reflection-symmetry (parity)" (Formal Logic, Totality and the Super-additive Principle, 1966, p. 6).

The sentence stands in the conditional of the classical assumptions. Günther does not claim that nature follows it, and he neither foresaw nor explained the violation of parity. What he says is that a logic that knows only reflections cannot grasp a world that breaks them.

Breaking and history

If the law stays symmetric and the state does not, then what cosmology calls history begins where a state breaks the symmetry of the law. Today's cosmology tells the development of the universe as a sequence of such breakings (Mainzer, col. 750). Of this, the mechanism of electroweak breaking is supported, since the detection of a Higgs boson in 2012 (ATLAS, Phys. Lett. B 716, 2012, 1); what cosmology makes of it as a history of the early universe is model, and what lies before remains hypothesis. The handedness of life belongs here too. Pasteur had separated the two mirror-image forms of a salt of tartaric acid in 1848 (Mainzer, col. 751); whether the handedness of life's building blocks goes back to the tiny energy difference that parity violation produces between mirror-image molecules is conjectured, but "not yet supported by either theoretical or experimental findings" (Blackmond 2019, p. 3).

Günther calls the ground of natural history by its name. In Lille, in 1968, he speaks of the "concept of history of nature grounded in the mechanism of entropy" (our translation) (Strukturelle Minimalbedingungen einer Theorie des objektiven Geistes, p. 17). And earlier still: "As far as the physically natural, that is, the materiality of the world, is concerned, its historical dimension lies in its entropy properties, as C. F. von Weizsäcker has set out in detail." (our translation) (Das Bewußtsein der Maschinen, 2nd ed. 1963, p. 156.) For him, then, matter has history, and he says in what.

Entropy: the direction

What physics calls entropy is first a count. A state that we describe on the large scale, pressure, temperature, volume, can be realized by very many arrangements of the molecules; the logarithm of this number is the entropy (Boltzmann). The laws of mechanics single out no direction of time; the direction comes from the fact that states with more realizations are more probable. Against this there has stood, since the nineteenth century, an objection, Loschmidt's: if every motion is also allowed backwards, why does the world not run backwards just as often? (Kratzer, art. Entropie, HWPh 2, cols. 540 f.)

An influential answer today: the direction does not come from the laws, but from the beginning. The state from which the universe started had a very low entropy. Feynman put it this way in 1964: one must add "to the physical laws the hypothesis that in the past the universe was more ordered, in the technical sense, than it is today", and this statement belongs not to the laws but to the state in which the universe was; "perhaps some day it will also be a part of physical law" (Feynman, p. 116; Lebowitz, Physics Today 46, 1993, pp. 36 f.). How the beginning could be ordered, although matter and radiation were then nearly in thermal equilibrium, Penrose explains with a hypothesis he himself calls "still a little vague": the order lay not in the distribution of matter but in a very special geometry (Penrose, in: Hawking/Israel, General Relativity, 1979, p. 630). Here too: the law does not have the direction; the state has it. Whether the entropy of the beginning is well defined at all is itself disputed; Earman therefore doubts that the assumption can be formulated consistently, and calls it "Not Even False" (Earman 2006).

The second law is thus a statistical law, and a textbook of today says so in a parenthesis. A gas will "never compress itself spontaneously into a smaller volume", "more precisely – 'only' the probability is vanishingly small" (our translation) (Tipler/Mosca, Physik, 6th ed., 19.5, p. 754). How small can be calculated. For a closed system the probability of a state far from equilibrium is proportional to e^{S/k_B}, with S the entropy of that state (Thorne/Blandford, Modern Classical Physics, 5.6, eq. 5.69a, pp. 261 f.). That a gas draws itself spontaneously into half its volume has accordingly, for N molecules, the probability 2^{−N}; for the roughly 10²⁶ molecules of a cubic metre of air that is a number with about 3·10²⁵ zeros after the decimal point (calculated by us from eq. 5.69a). Whoever waits for it needs patience. The ordinary fluctuations of the same cubic metre are of the order 10⁻¹³ (Thorne/Blandford, p. 263). Not excluded, but quantified.

Where the increase comes from, Thorne and Blandford say at a place that brings the observer into physics. Finely resolved, the entropy of an ensemble is conserved (Liouville); the region it occupies in the space of all states is only distorted ever more finely. Only when one no longer follows the distortions and averages over cells does it grow: "for an ensemble of closed systems it is the physicist's choice (though often a practical necessity) to perform coarse-grain averaging that causes entropy to increase and causes the ensemble to evolve into statistical equilibrium." (4.7, p. 184; italics in the original.) As a picture: a photo scaled down to fewer pixels. In the original nothing is lost; one only no longer follows it. That is their formulation, and it is not the only one: the Boltzmann line holds against it that entropy belongs to every single microstate by way of its macrostate, and that its growth is "typical" for the single system (Lebowitz 1993, p. 32). The choice of which Thorne and Blandford speak belongs to the description by ensembles; whoever follows the Boltzmann line does not need it. What coarse-graining explains is why entropy grows in one direction if it was low at the start; why it was low at the start, it does not explain (Lebowitz 1993, pp. 36 f.).

And since Landauer it has been known that erasing, too, has a price: whoever erases one bit of information gives off to the environment at least the heat k_B T ln 2 (Landauer, IBM J. Res. Dev. 5, 1961, p. 187); since 2012 this has been measured on model systems, and whether it has been derived in general remains disputed (Chattopadhyay et al. 2025, secs. II, V). Also disputed is whether the principle holds for erasure in general: Norton ties the entropy cost to a particular, thermodynamically irreversible kind of erasure, "whose necessity has not been demonstrated" (Norton 2005, abstract). Whether the coarse-graining of a description is such an erasure, Landauer's principle does not say. It shows in one case what the second law says in general for system and environment. If the one who describes is himself a physical system, then what he does stands in the same balance as what he describes. That the physicist belongs to the system he studies, Thorne and Blandford say themselves (p. 185, bottom); that he therefore appears in the entropy balance, we infer from it.

Günther knew the objections to the law of entropy, and his judgement is unambiguous: "The counter-arguments have not refuted the law of entropy. It would de facto be bad if they did. For if we denied the physical world the one-directedness of the course of time, it would become entirely incomprehensible how we could distinguish, in consciousness, memory from the perception of the present." (our translation) And he says what kind of time this is: "The concept of time of what we call the history of nature is oriented by the principle of an irreversible loss of order." (our translation) (Das Bewußtsein der Maschinen, p. 157.) The statistical side of the direction he had seen earlier, in the posthumous work on America, at the roulette table: "Causal statements are not absolute statements of truth … They are rather theorems of probability. Nothing more." (our translation) (Die Amerikanische Apokalypse, p. 121.) Of the pull towards the more probable he says what Boltzmann says: "About the character of necessity of the development from less probable to more probable total states hardly a word need be lost; it is mathematically demonstrable." (our translation) (p. 134.)

The second law as a tendency with quantifiable exceptions, not as a prohibition: that is what statistical mechanics has said since the nineteenth century (Lebowitz 1993). Ours is only that we lay Günther's roulette beside it. His sentence on causality as probability is one of the 1950s, not of today's theory of causation.

Life: order against the direction

That a system builds up order does not contradict the second law, as long as its environment gains at least as much entropy; the second law holds for system and environment together (Tipler/Mosca, pp. 753 f.). Schrödinger put it this way in 1944: "What an organism feeds on is negative entropy. Or, to put it somewhat less paradoxically, the essential thing in metabolism is that the organism succeeds in freeing itself from the entropy which it must produce as long as it lives." (our translation from the German edition) (Was ist Leben?, §57, p. 126.) In a note he added that for specialists he would have spoken of free energy (note to ch. VI, p. 130). What has remained is the export of entropy with a supply of free energy. How order arises and maintains itself far from equilibrium, Prigogine described: dissipative structures that live from a throughflow and pass away with it (Kondepudi/Prigogine, Modern Thermodynamics, 2nd ed. 2015, sec. 1.3, pp. 8 f.; ch. 19).

In Günther, a world picture stands at this place. In the posthumous work, following Weizsäcker: "We can thus observe, already in the purely physical course of the processes in our universe, two dominant counter-running tendencies. First the general progression from less probable to more probable states of the world, and second the individualizing progression from probable chaos to improbable form and order." (our translation) (Die Amerikanische Apokalypse, p. 148.) The second is for him no exception to the first. A situation whose tendency it is "to pass in general into ever more probable states" produces "at the same time the conditions for the appearance of ever more improbable individual regions (series)" (our translations) (p. 133). His example is man, "an extraordinarily improbable formation of reality" (our translation) (p. 145; Günther's account following Gehlen and Nicolai Hartmann).

What Schrödinger and Prigogine describe is the condition under which Günther's second progression does not contradict the first. That it is a tendency of the world of its own, a "dominant" one, physics does not say. Nor does it say how often life happens: it is known that it has happened at least once; how, and how often, is not. Ours is only that we lay Günther's world picture beside the balance of thermodynamics.

In 1979 Günther puts the location of life into a conditional. If one assumes that the universe is aware of itself, "not as a totality in the sense of pan-psychism but aware of itself in certain preferred localities with a highly complex structure", then, he writes, "the necessity of maintaining the status of a level of complexity, which is higher than that of the environment" brings forth events in a system of awareness (Cognition and Volition, p. 15). A system that keeps its complexity above that of its environment: this is how thermodynamics describes the open system. That Günther's sentence speaks of it is our synopsis; his word is "level of complexity", not "open", and his sentence concerns the events in a system of awareness.

The observer who coarse-grains

The observer at issue here is the one who coarse-grains, not the one who measures. He collapses no wave function; he discards what he cannot follow, and his erasing costs something. That he exists, the textbook itself says, and it says where this leads. If one regarded the universe as the ultimate closed system, one might expect its entropy to remain zero for all time, "unless physicists (or other intelligent beings) perform some sort of coarse-graining or discard some sort of correlations. However, such coarse-graining or discarding are made deeply subtle by the fact that the physicists (or other intelligent beings) are themselves part of the system being studied." (Thorne/Blandford 4.7, p. 185.) What follows further, they call "fascinating, though ill-understood, quantum mechanical and cosmological considerations".

Günther found this question in a physicist, long before it stood in textbooks: in Schrödinger. Classical logic, he writes in 1966, "excludes the subject of thought from the logical picture of the Universe", and for this he refers to Schrödinger's "Mind and Matter" (Formal Logic, Totality and the Super-additive Principle, p. 3 with n. 4). A year later he renders Schrödinger thus: "The world picture that our exact science has developed so far describes a universe without living centres of the I. Western man of the 20th century possesses a scientific world picture from which the subject who acquired this world picture is excluded." (our translation) What is demanded is "to design a scientific world picture that describes not only the known but also the knowing" (our translation) (Logik, Zeit, Emanation und Evolution, pp. 105 f.; Günther calls the demand the "Schrödingerian" one).

Thorne's physicist, who is part of what he describes, and Schrödinger's world picture without the one who acquired it: we see in them the same empty place. That it recurs in the textbook as a marginal remark of thermodynamics is our observation; neither Thorne nor Günther draws the line. What Günther puts in its place is no ensouled universe. Awareness exists for him only at a few locations, "restricted to certain ontologically preferred localities which show a highly complex structure", and the price for it is to be "suspended in this unresolvable duality", the duality of cognition and volition (Cognition and Volition, p. 17).

In the text of 1967 Günther passes, right after the Schrödingerian demand, from Schrödinger's excluded subject to time: "A link must be found that is neither pure objectivity nor unattainable introscendence (Introszendenz) of subjectivity. Now there is such a link, it is time!" (our translation) (Logik, Zeit, Emanation und Evolution, p. 106.) The old dispute whether time "has an objectively metaphysical character or whether it is a merely subjective form of intuition" (our translation), we read as an ancestor of our open question; the two are not the same.

Time as presupposition

What physics says up to here can be put in a formula; the formula is ours, the sentence is theirs: The law has no history. The history lies in the state, or, with Thorne and Blandford, in the choice of the one who coarse-grains his description. Physics made this separation before us, where, with Feynman, it separates the laws by which the universe develops from the state in which it was; Feynman himself left open that this state too might "some day" become law (p. 116).

In the posthumous work on America, on a different subject, Günther wrote a sentence that strikes this separation. He asks what matter is, gives an answer and says why one cannot ask behind it:

Physical being (matter) is a relation of alternation or transformation of material and energy, which for its part stands in a physically relevant relation to space and time. […] With this, however, it becomes evident that the question: What is matter? cannot be pursued further ad infinitum. […] The presuppositions of the question itself cannot be answered along with it in the answer. Such presuppositions, however, are space and time.

(our translation) (Die Amerikanische Apokalypse, pp. 19 f.)

What is presupposed does not occur in the answer. We read this towards time as a parameter; the direction comes only with the state. The laws of mechanics say what happens in time; that time has a direction is none of their answers, and Feynman must add it as a hypothesis. The reading is ours; at this passage Günther speaks of matter. But he also says what happens when a presupposition is itself questioned: where space becomes "the object of a physical science", it no longer appears as a presupposition, but "as a co-ordinate, new physical reality, side by side with substance and energy" (our translations) (p. 20).

Why a logic of mere being cannot grasp time, Günther says in 1967:

The theme of classical logic is reflectionless being, which is incapable of making an image of itself. With this, however, the problem of time is excluded from this logic in principle, for the relation between original and image is – ontologically considered – temporal. The thing itself must first be there before one can make an image of it. The image falls under the metaphysical category of repetition.

(our translation) (Logik, Zeit, Emanation und Evolution, pp. 109 f.; the first sentence in italics in the print)

An image comes after the thing. Applied to physics, and the application is ours, the sentence first strikes only the formula: whoever writes down a law comes after what he describes. About the law itself nothing is decided by this. If it already lies in the thing, it is found, and only its formula has a date. That is the question of discovered or invented, posed here for the laws of nature, and it remains open. The sentence strikes coarse-graining more clearly: whoever coarse-grains makes an image that contains less than the thing, and he needs the thing first. Read this way, Thorne's physicist, who is part of the system he coarse-grains, is the place at which a being does after all make an image of itself.

Physics knows the question in its own language. Its laws are written as laws of evolution: they say how quantities change with time, and in doing so they presuppose time. On the face of it, write Huggett, Vistarini and Wüthrich, quantum mechanics and Newtonian mechanics treat time as "a parameter presumed by, and hence independent of, dynamics" (Time in quantum gravity, 2012, introduction). In general relativity the geometry of space and time itself belongs to what the equations determine; the theory no longer permits a fixed background, and is therefore called "background independent" (ibid., sec. 2.1). And where physics seeks to join gravitation and quantum theory, according to an important class of approaches there is "no time left fundamentally at all" (ibid., introduction). That is open research, not a result. Whether time is fundamental or emergent is unresolved.

So one cannot simply choose between condition and consequence. Time is the condition under which laws are formulated, and at the same time what it is in detail, its geometry and its direction, depends on laws and states. Both hold in what we here take together as one physics, and they are two different dependences: the one concerns the formulating, the other the shape. That is no contradiction, and no answer to the question either.

Günther comes back to original and image in 1979, with the same figure as in 1967. Because the two do not differ in their determinations, he writes, they can "only be registered as two – with the proviso: first the one was there and in it it was repeated. In the category of repetition, however, we begin to understand time. Time, however, is nothing other than the ontic shape of the exchange relation." (our translation) (Identität, Gegenidentität und Negativsprache, p. 19.) Two, distinguished by nothing but that one was there first: here, Günther says, we begin to understand time. At neither passage does he speak of laws of nature.

Event or action

Physics, as presented here, has what the law does not fix as a state: it occurs, and no one wills anything. Only at one place does a word fall in it that means no occurring. Thorne and Blandford call coarse-graining "the physicist's choice". So the textbook formulates it; the Boltzmann line formulates differently. A choice does not occur; it is made, and by one who, according to the same textbook, is part of the system. That makes coarse-graining, as the textbook says, "deeply subtle"; how something that is part of what happens can choose, physics does not say. The observation is ours.

At this place stands Günther's question. To whoever thinks from being, he writes in 1978, "the problem of time appears only as a disturbing factor", where the task is "to explore the 'eternal' laws of the real" (our translations) (Idee, Zeit und Materie, print p. 244). To read the world as a sequence of events is for him one of two interpretations that two-valued logic permits, "of which only one is laid claim to in the concept of event" (our translation) (print p. 246). The other leads to the concept of action: "Not only does something happen, but something is done." (our translation) (print p. 246) And so he asks "what action, as opposed to mere event, is actually supposed to be" (our translation) (print p. 243).

Whether a state of physics is an action, Günther does not ask, and we do not claim it. But where a physics textbook writes "choice", we see his question posed. How he pursues it is shown by the sheet Where the Axioms Come From.

What of this can be computed

The edition Rev11 has no word entropy, no measure of coarse-graining and no life; about nature it says nothing. What it has are symmetries, finite ones: the reversal of the values, the sense of rotation of a circle, the permutations. A feature that respects the reversal of the values and the reversal of the sense of rotation is constant on the four aspects of a circle: the circle itself, its value reversal, its opposite sense and both together (proved [151]); from four values on, the four, read from the same start, are different (proved [152]). With three values reversal and sense of rotation coincide, from four on never (proved [147]). These are reversals of the calculation, not of physics: the reversal interchanges values, it is no time reversal; whether either of the two may be called "parity", neither Günther nor the edition says. That the invariant corresponds to the law and a single one of the four aspects to the state is our assignment, not a statement of the edition.

The edition knows a choice that no reversal-respecting feature makes: in which sense of rotation a circle is read. With three values the sequence in the opposite sense is the reversal of the other, and no feature that respects the reversal separates the two (proved [139]). Who chooses does not stand in the edition; «The corpus contains no I and no Thou.» (edition, chapter 8) Whether this choice has anything to do with the one that, according to Thorne, the physicist makes in coarse-graining, neither the edition nor physics says.

And the edition knows a step that does not lead back. When the number of values rises, «the image of the old stage does not reach the new element [71]. What is added was not there before.» (edition, chapter 6) Beside this it shows two things: one rule is the same at every stage ([69]), and the reversal of the values is never carried along by the step ([72]). The step is a construction, not a process in time.

And the edition has a chapter on time (chapter 3). It begins with three sentences of Günther's from 1937: time is more powerful than will, thought more powerful than time, will more powerful than thought. The three cannot be brought into a ranking; they close into a circle. That time, thought and will behave this way, the edition does not claim. What is proved is the other half: in no transitive, irreflexive ordering is such a three-cycle possible (proved [50]), and it cannot be mapped into any ([51]). If the three behave this way, no line measures them. Günther also writes in 1937 that for two times there is "no common, objective (objectual) measure of time" (our translation) (Wahrheit, Wirklichkeit und Zeit, p. 3); in the edition two times that reverse each other have no common measure (proved [52]), and that Günther's two times reverse each other is its reading. That is time as order, not as duration, and not the time of thermodynamics.

Back to the question

Is time a consequence or a condition of the laws of nature? Physics, read closely, gives both answers at once. It writes its laws in time and in doing so presupposes it. And it derives what time is in detail from laws and states: the geometry from the equations of relativity theory, the direction from the state, ultimately from the beginning. At three places it says what it does not know: why entropy was low at the beginning; what it means that the observer who coarse-grains is part of what he describes; and how often life happens.

Günther's sentence that the thing must first be there before one can make an image of it does not decide the question. It strikes the formula, not necessarily the law: if the law already lies in the thing, only the one who writes it down comes later. What the sentence achieves is something else. It says why time falls out of a logic whose being makes no image of itself, and it thereby strikes the place at which physics itself falters: the physicist who coarse-grains, is part of what he describes, and chooses.

Little of all this is computed, and the little is exact. Where time, thought and will surpass one another in a circle, no line measures them. And what is added when the number of values rises was not there before; whether that is a change of the structural principle, as Günther in 1970 demands it for the new, or a new state under a rule that spans the stages, is open.

Whether mathematics is discovered or invented is not decided. Whether time precedes the laws or follows from them is not decided either; physics says both at once, and in its language: whether time is ultimately fundamental or emergent is unresolved. At the passage where he calls original and image temporal, Günther put a question to logic, not to physics: "Can a trans-classical logic of a shape still unknown today be developed which […] contains the ontological category of repetition […] as a structural basic element?" (our translation) (Logik, Zeit, Emanation und Evolution, p. 110.) And he asked what it means that someone does something and that something does not merely happen to him. The answer to that is still outstanding.


On citation. Günther is given with work and page; the sentences of physics with the textbook or paper from which they come. What we have computed or put together ourselves is marked as ours. About the edition Rev11 (anchor 24fa57a, 31 October 2026) this sheet claims nothing that it does not say itself.


Sources

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