PKL Rev11

Philosophy

Aletheia, truth, "that which is not concealed": to seek it out, Günther calls the self-confessed aim of classical science (Cognition and Volition, p. 33). Whoever wants to construct "action – and with it subjectivity – technically in progressive stages" (our translation) (Identität, Gegenidentität und Negativsprache, p. 56, source-verified) must take new paths. Günther takes one with his negation sequences and cycles: their equivalences are to him instructions for action that can be fulfilled only in the medium of technology (pp. 29 f.). What of this is constitutive and therefore technically repeatable he says himself: only partial cycles; the full cycles from four values on he calls regulative (p. 57; below, Acting and knowing). As early as 1971 he names what remains beyond repetition: not to repeat and imitate living systems technically; instead, "we strive to understand what is left after the engineer has done his work" (Natural Numbers in Trans-Classic Systems, Part I, Journal of Cybernetics 1971; p. 3 of the vordenker version 2004, source-verified; italics Günther's). We read it so: what subjectivity is beyond that poses itself anew as a question. — The picture: Günther's second circle (IGN p. 44, supplemented by two steps) as a ring, 24 negations, every arrangement exactly once, seen from above clockwise, back to the start 1234 (front). Ochre: N₁, the values 1 and 2 are exchanged. Blue: N₂, the values 2 and 3 are exchanged. Crimson: N₃, the values 3 and 4 are exchanged. Light and dark are only light. The stations: 1234 · 2134 · 3124 · 4123 · 4213 · 3214 · 2314 · 1324 · 1423 · 2413 · 3412 · 4312 · 4321 · 3421 · 2431 · 1432 · 1342 · 2341 · 3241 · 4231 · 4132 · 3142 · 2143 · 1243.

This page follows a thread through Gotthard Günther's writings to the question with which the edition Rev11 ends. About Günther it claims nothing that has not been checked at the page named, and about the corpus, the built and checked part, nothing that the edition does not prove, measure or interpret; every such statement points to its place there. It uses Günther's words in his sense or in quotation. The marks are those of the edition: proved with a numeral means that a theorem of the corpus is machine-checked; source-verified means that Günther's wording is checked at the page named; assignment, our reading and synopsis are interpretation and are called so. Günther's wording stands in "…", the edition's in «…»; Günther's German is given in our translation and marked so. What the built objects are — values, negators, circles, reversal, sense of rotation — is explained on the page Mathematics.

The question

In 1933, in his book on Hegel's logic, Günther asks a question: "does reason, in all its historical forms of appearance, really explicate itself by means of the same system of determinations?" And he judges: "It is perhaps Hegel's greatest strictly scientific achievement to have seen that this question, although scientifically solvable, could not be answered with the logical tools of his time." (our translations) (Grundzüge einer neuen Theorie des Denkens in Hegels Logik, p. 135, source-verified.) Two pages earlier he names what is missing, as a conjecture and printed letterspaced: "that here we stand before the second formal logic we are seeking" (our translation) (p. 133, source-verified).

Hegel's solution Günther renders in the same book thus: "Objectivity and subjectivity in the concept are only variable values of a relation of correlation. But by no means absolute opposites." (our translation) (p. 47, source-verified; Günther's rendering, not a quotation from Hegel.) In 1959 the pair stands differently, as I and Thou: "A three-valued logic, however, presupposes that it is logically relevant whether I describe the process of reflection in the subjective subject (I) or in the objective subject (Thou)." (our translation) (Idee und Grundriss einer nicht-Aristotelischen Logik, preface to the first edition, p. XIX, source-verified.) In the first chapter of the same book, "Das logische Problem des Du" (the logical problem of the Thou), one section is called "Subjective subject and objective subject as logical values" (our translation) (p. 86, source-verified). In 1979, finally, in Cognition and Volition, the pair stands as a tenet: "Subjectivity is a phenomenon distributed over the dialectic antithesis of the Ego as the subjective subject and the Thou as the objective subject, both of them having a common mediating environment." (p. 6, source-verified; edition, conclusion.)

How far this reaches. The three places form a line across two words that change their object in Günther. In 1933 subjectivity and objectivity are called "values" of a relation; in 1959 subjective and objective subject are called "logical values"; in 1979 the word is missing. In 1963 and 1971 Günther takes I and Thou as systems: in 1963 each is a pair of values, a two-valued "system" (our translation) (Das Bewußtsein der Maschinen, Table VII, p. 78, source-verified), in 1971 an "elementary contexture" (our translation) (Die Theorie der „mehrwertigen" Logik, p. 9, source-verified). The line is our synopsis. It equates neither the pairs nor the values, and the values of the corpus are neither of the two: «the corpus carries no semantics of values» (edition, C.4).

The private

"But Descartes – however right he was with his new approach – committed a fundamental error", Günther writes (Idee und Grundriss, p. 50, source-verified; our translation): "In the Cogito, ergo sum the one who reflects goes back only to his own I" (p. 51, source-verified; our translation). The Cogito reaches only «the accidental I that happens to apply the Cartesian formula» (p. 51; edition, conclusion). And then: "This, however, suggests the infinitely important thought that subjectivity is fundamentally single and intimately private, and that 'subjectivity-as-such', i.e. that sphere in which intersubjective generality is constituted, is in truth trans-subjective." A few lines further on: "… that the I can be conceived both subjectively as private self and objectively as public Thou." (our translations) (p. 51, source-verified.) Günther develops this thought in his account of Schelling, and he adds a reservation: "We shall see later that even this is not yet enough" (our translation) (ibid.). The thought is his; it is not his last word (our reading).

In his own voice, without Schelling, he says it again in 1960 and 1963. In the animal body subjectivity reflects itself "only as an isolated I. That is, in the most intimate, most private manner, excluding all alien subjectivity." (our translation) (Schöpfung, Reflexion und Geschichte, p. 34, source-verified.) "But that pure subjectivity is accessible to us only in the intimate privacy of one's own I." (our translation) (Das Bewußtsein der Maschinen, 2nd ed., p. 42, source-verified.)

On the next page Günther himself draws the consequence: "For if two different I's cannot share and hold in common the inwardness that is privately their own, then only one way remains to an ontologically binding and objectively obligatory agreement between them. Namely, that in common action they set the image of their subjectivity out of themselves and construct it technically in the objective." (our translation) (p. 43, source-verified.) In 1970 he grounds the same limit a second time, structurally: "psychic experiences that are bound to different I-centres" belong to "different contextures"; there is a "structural break that … makes it impossible for a given I ever to experience the experiences of a Thou as its own" (our translations) (Die historische Kategorie des Neuen, pp. 6/7, source-verified; edition, conclusion).

How far this reaches. «The corpus contains no I and no Thou.» (edition, chapter 8)

Acting and knowing

In the Heidegger essay of 1980 Günther adduces a sentence of Arnold Gehlen: the necessity to act reaches further than the necessity to know. A few sentences later he says himself, in a paragraph on action, world history and creation: "And only insofar as being has been created does thinking have the possibility of knowing." (our translation) (Martin Heidegger und die Weltgeschichte des Nichts, p. 26, source-verified; Günther identifies the word as Gehlen's.) We read this sentence as a description of our way of working; that is our reading, not his. What is built here are Günther's circles as objects of a calculus, checked by a proof checker, and every statement says whether it is Günther's, ours, or proved.

What is accessible to technology Günther says first of the splitting of I and Thou: "But in the splitting of I and Thou we encounter a constitutive property of the world. And insofar as it is constitutive, it is also repeatable and thus accessible to technology." Two paragraphs further on he equates the Hamiltonian full cycles, "At least from four-valuedness on", with a regulative concept (our translations) (Identität, Gegenidentität und Negativsprache, p. 57, source-verified; edition, C.8). Affected by this, according to the edition, are also the four-valued full cycles that the corpus counts (C.8); that the judgement concerns the role of a circle in a world and not its occurrence in the calculus is our reading.

How far this reaches. «A proof checker is technology. Whether what it checks here is the splitting Günther speaks of, neither of the two says.» (edition, conclusion)

The choice

In Cognition and Volition Buridan's ass stands between two equal bundles of hay, and Günther says of it: "The ass when facing the two bundles cannot remain in a situation of suspended choice …"; it is "the animal in this case which has to supply this order by making a choice" (p. 16, source-verified). On his circles he describes in 1980 a choice for which there is likewise no theoretical reason. A circle can be traversed in two senses of rotation, "and there is no theoretical authority in the whole universe that could tell us which sense of rotation should be preferred to the other"; and yet all theoretical identity is grounded "in an entirely untheoretical act that precedes it" (our translations) (Heidegger essay, pp. 26 f., source-verified). A year earlier, more narrowly: a trinitarian logic gives "no hint" (our translation) (IGN p. 20, source-verified). Both stand in the report, O7. That it is the same situation as the ass's is our synopsis.

The corpus says one theorem on this: with three values the sequence in the opposite sense is the reversal of the other and runs through the same stations backwards, and no feature that respects the reversal of the values separates the two (proved [139]).

How far this reaches. «The theorem of the corpus holds for three values; it thus stands at the reach of 1979, not at that of 1980. … The bridge between the two is ours. Günther speaks of theoretical reasons, the theorem of features that respect the reversal.» (report, O7) And which haystack the animal eats, the edition leaves open, «and it may not derive it»: a theorem that derived the choice would reduce action to a ground, and with that there would be no freedom (Günther, following Schelling, IGN p. 53; edition, C.3); that this ground affects the corpus is our reading there.

Heterarchy

In 1937 Günther sets up three propositions: time is more powerful than will, thought more powerful than time, will more powerful than thought. They cannot be brought into a ranking; they close into a circle (edition, chapter 3). What is proved is that such a three-cycle cannot exist in any transitive, irreflexive ordering (proved [50]); that its corners are called thought, will and time is interpretation.

In 1979 Günther calls one connection heterarchical, that of cognition and volition: a connection that is "in its inner core heterarchical" and is governed by the proemial relation (C&V p. 33, source-verified; edition, chapter 7). The proemial relation is for him the relation in which what connects can itself become what is connected at another level, and what is connected what connects; the exchange is "not mutual" (edition, C.1). Identität, Gegenidentität und Negativsprache sets at the same place a neutral medium, number (Günther, following Schelling, IGN pp. 53 f.; edition, chapter 7).

How far this reaches. The proemial relation is not built. «It is the pivot of Günther's late theory» (edition, chapter 7); what was attempted towards it and where it failed, C.1 says.

The Thou

The viewpoint. Who is subjective and who is objective subject depends in Günther on the viewpoint: "Although everyone of us from his own viewpoint is the subjective Ego and any other subject is an objective Thou the situation is reversed from the viewpoint of any Thou." (C&V p. 7, source-verified.) If the universal subject is missing as guarantor of general subjectivity, then "for every I that is thinking at a given time … every other I is given not as I, but exclusively as Thou (as object in the world)" (our translation) (Idee und Grundriss, p. 89, source-verified; italics Günther's).

The exchange. As early as 1960 Günther writes "that I and Thou, within the total domain of distribution of subjectivity, stand in an exact exchange relation of the centres of reflection" (our translation) (Schöpfung, Reflexion und Geschichte, pp. 11 f., source-verified). For the logician who describes the gradient in both directions, "both situations cannot exist simultaneously" (our translation) (Idee und Grundriss, p. 94, source-verified). In 1979 I and Thou stand in the proemial relation, with a frame without which the sentence cannot be quoted. It has "one thing in common with the classic symmetrical exchange relation"; this holds "to the mutual position of the subjective subject as the I and the objective subject as the Thou, insofar as what is now I may become a Thou, and what has been the Thou may become the I"; but "the exchange is not symmetrical" (C&V p. 21, source-verified).

History. In 1960 Günther calls the historical world "a work of human subjectivity which, in the confrontation between I and Thou, has stepped out of its inner privacy" (our translation) (Schöpfung, Reflexion und Geschichte, p. 16, source-verified). In 1970 he calls the relation of discontexturality between being and nothing, as between I- and Thou-subjectivity, "symmetrical – that is, an exchange relation – and not hierarchical" (our translation) (Die historische Kategorie des Neuen, p. 8, source-verified), and for the new he demands "a non-reversible relation of discontexturality" (our translation) (p. 9, source-verified). I- and Thou-subjectivity he counts there, beside being and nothing and past and future in the chronological sense, among the "unordered pairs of contextures"; to make a sequence of stages out of them, "we must find a scheme according to which all contextures that are possible at all can be ordered" (our translations) (pp. 9 f., source-verified). Whether this scheme orders the relation of I and Thou itself or only the contextures between which it stands, we do not say.

How far this reaches. Trans-classical logic, Günther writes, "stipulates that subjects are only negatively identifiable" (C&V p. 33, source-verified; edition, conclusion). In 1959 Günther sets subjective and objective subject "in the relation of reciprocal negation" (Idee und Grundriss, p. 94, source-verified), and negation is for him "an exchange relation between two values" (our translations) (ibid.); the negators of the corpus exchange values. Whether the exchange of I and Thou is one of these negators, we do not say: «the corpus carries no semantics of values» (edition, C.4). The exchange of level, in which what connects becomes what is connected, the corpus does not have: it would be the proemial relation.

The question of the edition

«What withstands every aspect we call general; Günther sees the general represented in the Thou. Whether the two have to do with each other, we ask. The corpus does not answer it.» (edition, conclusion)


This page refers to the edition Rev11 of the mathematical shape of the architecture, at anchor 24fa57a (tag rev11), of 31 October 2026. It is itself not an edition; about the corpus it claims nothing beyond that edition, and Günther's passages that the edition does not carry stand with their page, checked on the page image.