PKL Rev11

Appendix A · Being, Sense and the Exchange

Whoever reads Günther soon comes upon a word: exchange relation (Umtauschverhältnis). And whoever opens the edition finds circles and numbers. Both are understood only by one who knows what Günther reads into the oldest propositions of logic. This appendix shows it, from a question put to metaphysics up to the circles.

A.1 · Is metaphysics a special case of poetry?

Günther answers the question in 1959 without putting it this way. People had begun, he writes,

to turn away from a venerable two-thousand-year-old tradition that has striven with increasing success to establish philosophy, and especially metaphysics, as a rigorous science, and to degrade the discipline of Plato, Aristotle, Kant and Hegel to a special case of poetry. Ironically, this happens in the very epoch that has finally succeeded, for the first time, in demonstrating metaphysics as a science of mathematical rigour.

(our translation) (Idee und Grundriss, p. 16)

Who succeeded, the note says: meant is "the hardly overestimable work of Heinrich Scholz, Metaphysik als strenge Wissenschaft" (our translation) (n. 29).

In 1941 Scholz takes Kant at his word. Kant had declared "that he would regard himself as refuted by a single unassailable metaphysical proposition"; Scholz announces "a countably infinite set of such propositions" (our translations) (p. 12). They are propositions about identity and difference. They hold "in every non-empty domain of individuals and, in this well-determined sense, in every possible world" (our translation) (p. 14), and about them one is to be able "to communicate in the whole world as about a mathematical proposition or proof" (our translation) (p. 46). That is not poetry.

Günther takes his stand on this. A metaphysics that clothes itself "in a mystical or poetic language" he rejects:

We want to leave no doubt that we reject this attitude outright and profess the concept of metaphysics as it has been developed methodically by H. Scholz on the basis of symbolic logic.

(our translation) (Idee und Grundriss, p. 30)

Among the logicians of his time Scholz is for him the exception: "The logistic party wants (with the exception of Heinrich Scholz) to have nothing at all to do with metaphysics, because it holds metaphysical statements to be senseless." (our translation) (ibid.)

And yet he does not go the whole way with him. Scholz's theory deals "exclusively with objective identity of being", and "the identity of a stone with itself is not the same as that of a concept with itself" (our translations) (p. 151). In this we read Günther's project: Scholz's rigour also for the identity that Scholz leaves out. What follows deals with that.

A.2 · What Günther's signs stand for

In 1954 Günther writes to Gödel that a three-valued logic requires "the introduction of a second negation". One must then distinguish “p” “∼p” and “∼′p”, namely

between thinking as such and two forms of what is thought (or existence)

(our translation) (letter 5, 2.10.1954, CW IV p. 508)

A logician reads in p and ∼p a statement and its negation. Günther reads in them a question of metaphysics: how thinking stands to what it thinks. That is the key to everything that follows.

Five years later he cites a witness from logic. Every universal statement, he writes, excludes itself from what it states: "It belongs to a higher logical type than its own content of statement." (our translation) (Idee und Grundriss, p. 16) In the note to this stands a sentence of the philosopher W. H. Werkmeister:

"The function which identifies a class is ... not the same as the totality of the members of that class."

(Werkmeister, An Introduction to Critical Thinking, p. 431; quoted after Günther, Idee und Grundriss, n. 28)

What determines a class is not once more one of its members. Günther draws from this: in the proposition that thinking and being are identical "a residue of reflection remains" (our translation) (ibid.). Werkmeister's sentence and Günther's sentence of 1954 have the same form: what determines is not one of the determined. The juxtaposition is ours.

A.3 · The ontic axiomatics

Classical logic, according to tradition, rests on four propositions. Günther counts them in 1957 thus:

1. the law of identity (doctrine of the concept),
2. the law of forbidden contradiction (theory of judgement),
3. the law of the excluded middle (syllogistics),

to which, as supplementary axiom, there is added

4. the law of sufficient ground [usually: principle of sufficient reason] (methodology)

(our translation) (Metaphysik, Logik und die Theorie der Reflexion, p. 5; the edition has "Ergänzungsaxioms" for "Ergänzungsaxiom")

This axiomatics grounds "the theme 'being' in consciousness", which is why one can call it the "'ontic' axiomatics" (our translations) (p. 25). What the first three propositions say about thinking and being Günther sums up in a single one:

In agreement with a tradition of metaphysics some 2000 years old, we assert that the law of identity postulates the metaphysical identity of thinking and being, and that the second axiom formulates the empirical difference of the two in the relation of contradiction of positivity and negation, while finally the tertium non datur must be interpreted to the effect that thinking and being can be identical only under the presupposition that positivity and negativity represent qualities of value of equivalent logical power, beside which no third logical dimension could be defined any more that might be able to disturb the strict congruence of thinking and being.

(our translation) (p. 10)

Günther asserts here what the propositions mean, not that they are true. In today's notation they look like this:

Proposition written today
Law of identity ∀x (x = x)
Law of forbidden contradiction ¬(p ∧ ¬p)
Law of the excluded middle p ∨ ¬p
Law of sufficient ground no formula

The three formulas are provable in classical logic. Some calculi take them as axioms, others derive them.

The law of identity. Scholz proves it as a theorem of his theory of identity: "⊢ Ox₀x₀≡x₀" (5.80, p. 109). The O, from Latin omnes, stands in his work "for every", the triple-barred ≡ for "is identical with" (our translations) (pp. 33, 32); the sign ⊢ says that the statement is a theorem of the theory of identity (p. 109), and such a theorem holds for him in every non-empty world (5.0.0, p. 83; p. 14). The formula therefore reads: for every x₀, x₀ is identical with x₀. At this one proposition three readers part. For Scholz every such proposition is "a statement about the totality of possible worlds. Thus the most demanding thing in the world." (our translation) (p. 170) Gödel names a = a as the pattern of what the axioms of mathematics precisely do not go back to: they are "by no means tautologies (in the sense of being in any way reducible to a = a)" (1951, p. 321). Günther reads it as the assertion that thinking and being are identical; his objection to Scholz we know from A.1.

The law of forbidden contradiction. In Günther it reads: "In this sense the prohibition of contradiction axiomatizes the thinkability of being." (our translation) (p. 8)

The law of the excluded middle. On it everything further hangs. Günther follows here, as he notes, "exactly the interpretation of the law of the excluded middle that Paul Hofmann" gave in 1931 (our translation) (p. 10, n. 9), and writes:

Thinking and being are of equal logical power! For the totality of all determinations of sense is exactly equivalent to the totality of all determinations of being.

A "third" would be possible only under the presupposition; that thinking represented a higher logical power than being […]

(our translation) (p. 9; two paragraphs; the semicolon so in the edition)

The law of sufficient ground. It has no formula, because it says nothing within logic, but something about it: that with the three others "the definitive universality of theoretical consciousness has been grounded sufficiently, finally and transcendentally" (our translation) (p. 5).

A.4 · If thinking is more than being

The law of the excluded middle thus says for Günther: thinking and being are equally powerful. A third would be possible only if thinking were more powerful than being. More does not stand at this passage: neither that thinking is more powerful, nor that a third then follows.

Where should thinking get a more from? Günther starts with Descartes, with the doubt that can doubt only one thing not: that it thinks.

With Descartes the concept of the object has become fundamentally ambiguous: first, it stands "against" thinking. Is thus transcendent; and second, this standing-against occurs only in thinking. Having objects is the way in which thinking relates to itself. The object is thus immanent. By occurring in this twofold way, it is positively ambiguous. It is two things: thing and motive of thought.

For us it is the decisive mark of all pre-Cartesian thinking that it nowhere becomes thematically aware of this fact.

(our translation) (Idee und Grundriss, p. 46)

Two-valued logic, he continues, describes exactly this "self-forgetfulness". For thinking it has only one sign: "Negation, which in this system represents the subject, is empty, indeterminate, nothing more than abstract, un-positive withdrawal of the determinate and positive." (our translations) (ibid.)

Whether Descartes' inference holds formally, again Scholz has examined; Günther calls this "the last building block for the system of inferences". Scholz comes "to the conclusion that the Cogito, ergo sum represents a valid implication", and the "Dubito, ergo sum" too is valid, under a presupposition about existence that Scholz states (our translations) (p. 52). Günther draws from this the sentence that matters here: "Being always implies only itself, but thinking implies itself as well as being" (our translation) (p. 53). In this we read the more.

In 1959 he gives it the rank of a theorem. The identity of thinking and being is "disputed with formal-logical arguments" and replaced by "the new metaphysical theorem":

thinking is of higher metaphysical power than being.

(our translation) (Idee und Grundriss, p. 13; in the edition italic and set off)

Günther had first grounded the theorem differently, three pages after the sentence, with the argument from A.2: the proposition that equates thinking and being is itself a thought and does not occur in what it equates. The thesis of identity cannot "itself be included in this coincidence" (our translation) (p. 16). In 1957 Günther had spoken of "the additional depth of reflection of consciousness as against being" (our translation) (Metaphysik, Logik und die Theorie der Reflexion, p. 21).

What follows from this? The classical propositions do not become false. They describe thinking insofar as it coincides with being, and Günther disputes only their claim to be the whole of rationality (ibid., p. 6). Of the residue that remains he writes: "It has, however, in philosophy so far led only to a highly negative result." (our translation) (Idee und Grundriss, p. 16; "It" is the fact of this residue) Meant is the turning away from rigorous science with which this appendix began. Günther draws a different result: for what remains he demands axioms of its own.

A.5 · The meontic axiomatics

The theme of the first axiomatics is being, Greek on. That of the second is what is not being. Because Plato names the non-being, according to Günther, "in metaphysical respect the μὴ ὄν, we want to call the second axiomatics, which determines the total negation of being, the meontic (meontisch) axiomatics" (our translation) (p. 25). No nothing is meant. Its theme is that "through which all being is first understood, namely sense" (our translation) (ibid.).

Günther develops four propositions, each in the place of a classical one.

The law of reflected counter-sense. Sense is "no identity, but a counter-relation" of two components, each of which contains the other as its negation; his example: "the sense 'truth' can only be understood through our also knowing the concept of error" (our translations) (p. 28). From this the axiom:

That is, every motive of sense is determined as a closed circle of reflection that runs through its own negation. We call the axiom that states this fact the law of reflected counter-sense.

It was discovered by Hegel, who describes it in the Greater Logic as "identity of reflection", without, to be sure, perceiving its fundamental and axiomatic character.

(our translation) (p. 29)

The law of thematic inversion, "analogous to the classical law of contradiction" (our translation):

That is, every motive of reflection is conceived as the thematic inversion of itself. That is the basic law under which sense becomes thinkable, and we call it the law of thematic inversion.

(our translation) (p. 29)

The law of infinite sequences of reflection:

every thematic inversion is object and theme of a higher (more general) reflection. To this new fundamental principle we give the name: law of infinite sequences of reflection. As one sees, it corresponds exactly to the tertium non datur of classical logic and supplements it without refuting it.

(our translation) (p. 29)

The law of transfinite origin. Günther grounds it as tradition grounds the law of ground (p. 30):

With this, however, self-consciousness occupies the place of the transfinite origin of every infinite series of reflection, whereby for any determination of consciousness whatever that is subject to the meontic axiomatics its introscendental legitimacy is guaranteed. We call this last basic law of the reflexive logic of sense the law of transfinite origin.

(our translation) (p. 31)

For none of the four does Günther give formulas, and we invent none. With the fourth the system is "in principle no longer capable of any extension or deepening of its foundations" (our translation) (p. 32).

A.6 · Günther's table

He puts both axiomatics together into one table (p. 32; the table in our translation):

Axiomatics of total rationality
Thematic of beingThematic of sense
Law of (metaphysical) identity.Law of reflected counter-sense.
Law of forbidden contradiction.Law of thematic inversion.
Law of the excluded middle.Law of infinite reflection.
Law of (transcendental) ground.Law of introscendent origin.

Two propositions bear a different name in the table than in the text: the "law of infinite sequences of reflection" has become the "law of infinite reflection", the "law of transfinite origin" the "law of introscendent origin". The second axiomatics does not replace the first:

Both systems of axioms together define the absolute domain of sense of the pure I, whereby the classical theory retains in all circumstances its specific claim to truth as logic of finite relations.

(our translation) (p. 32)

A.7 · Negation as exchange

The word falls already in 1954, in the letter to Gödel, and there for the two-valued itself: "The whole is a pure exchange relation, like 'right' and 'left'." (our translation) (letter 5, CW IV p. 512) In 1957 Günther uses it for I and Thou: they stand "in a real metaphysical relation of alternation or exchange in accordance with thematic inversion" (our translation) (p. 31). In 1978 Günther shows such a relation in the simplest table that logic has (Idee, Zeit und Materie, print p. 237; "Tafel I" in the print, the cells in our translation):

Tafel I
pN₁p
positivenegative
negativepositive

Negation exchanges two values for each other, and exchanged twice, nothing has happened. Günther writes on this: "The two-valued-symmetrical relation of negation (exchange relation), which underlies the dialectical process, can be interpreted either by starting from the relator or from the members of the relation." (our translation) (ibid.) The relator N₁ cannot "per se say […] whether p or not-p is or will be" (our translation) (ibid.). In the table, then, there are two things: what is exchanged, and what exchanges. In 1959 it was said that negation represents the subject in classical logic (A.4). Here it stands as relator, in Günther's word, and at the relator two world pictures part. Whoever starts from the members, from p and not-p, sees a being that is already decided; Günther calls it "Eleatic being" (our translation) (print p. 242). Whoever starts from the relator, which "only indicates a state of suspension", sees the world become a Heraclitean process, and can grasp as the last magnitude "only a will that manifests itself in a primordial decision which we call creation (Schöpfung)"; such a world picture aims "at the idea of a last universal subjectivity" (our translations) (print p. 237). A theoretical ground to prefer the one to the other Günther does not find (ibid.); of this the sheet treats. We read in this again the distinction from A.2, what is thought and the thinking; the connection of the passages of 1954, 1959 and 1978 is ours.

That exchange carries logic over into itself is mathematics. Günther cites Reinhold Baer for it: the propositional calculus with negation and conjunction can be mapped onto that with negation and disjunction, in that

1. To every statement its negation is assigned.
2. The basic relation 'negation' is assigned to itself.
3. The basic relation 'conjunction' is assigned to the basic relation 'disjunction'.

(our translation) (Baer, Hegel und die Mathematik, 1931; quoted in Idee, Zeit und Materie, print p. 239; Günther's reference there n. 2)

Baer bases this on three propositions: "a ≠ non-a", "a = non-non-a" and "non-(a ∧b) = non-a V non-b" (ibid.; the disjunction is set in the print as a capital V). Today the matter is called the duality principle of Boolean algebra, and at its core are the laws of De Morgan. Baer concludes that between positive and negative statements there is "no essential difference" (our translation) (print p. 239). On this Günther bases the thesis of the two equivalent systems of statements of which the sheet treats. And of this symmetry he says: "In it time is missing." (our translation) (print p. 241)

A.8 · From here to the circles

With two values there is one exchange. With three values one needs, as Günther writes in 1954, a second negation; with four values there are three. In the edition every negator exchanges two neighbouring values. Whoever carries out negators one after another wanders through the arrangements of the values; with four values there are twenty-four. Günther drew such paths as circles (Identität, Gegenidentität und Negativsprache, p. 44). Whether a circle closes, through how many arrangements it runs and what happens when one runs it backwards are questions that can be computed and proved. The edition does this: it proves, for example, that Günther's second circle, completed by two steps, runs through all twenty-four arrangements ([144]; the figures are on the page Mathematics).

The meontic axioms it does not prove, and it assigns none of its theorems to them. So we read the edition: it takes from Günther the exchange relation and asks what can be counted in it. How Günther in 1978 separates the value from its location is shown by Tafel III in the sheet.


Sources of this appendix

Günther: Metaphysik, Logik und die Theorie der Reflexion, Archiv für Philosophie 7 (1957), pp. 1–44; quoted after the vordenker.de edition (pages of that edition), pp. 5–10, 21, 25, 28–32. · Idee, Zeit und Materie, in: Beiträge zur Grundlegung einer operationsfähigen Dialektik, vol. 3, Hamburg 1980; after the print, pp. 237, 239, 241. · Idee und Grundriss einer nicht-Aristotelischen Logik (1959); quoted after the vordenker.de edition (2004), pp. 13, 16, 30, 46, 52 f., 151. · Letter 5 to Gödel, 2.10.1954, in: Kurt Gödel, Collected Works, vol. IV (Oxford 2003), pp. 508, 512.

W. H. Werkmeister, An Introduction to Critical Thinking, Lincoln 1948 (place and year after Günther's bibliography), p. 431; quoted after Günther, Idee und Grundriss, n. 28.

Gödel 1951: as in the sheet; p. 321.

Heinrich Scholz, Metaphysik als strenge Wissenschaft, Köln 1941; unchanged reprint Darmstadt 1965; pp. 12, 14, 32 f., 46, 83, 109, 170.

Reinhold Baer, Hegel und die Mathematik, in: Verhandlungen des zweiten Hegelkongresses vom 18.–21. Okt. 1931 in Berlin, Tübingen 1932, pp. 104 f.; quoted after Günther, print p. 239, with his reference (n. 2, p. 238).